Sabrina Rahofy v. Lynn Steadman and Steadman Land & Livestock LLC : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2009
Sabrina Rahofy v. Lynn Steadman and Steadman
Land & Livestock LLC : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Lowell V. Smith; Trent D Holgate; Smith & Glauser; Attorney for Appellees.
Jamis M. Gardner; Jacob W. Dowse; Thomas W. Seiler; Robinson, Seiler & Anderson; Attorneys for
Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Sabrina Rahofy v. Lynn Steadman and Steadman Land & Livestock, No. 20090512 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1743
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
SABRINA RAHOFY, an individual, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
LYNN STEADMAN, an individual, and 
STEADMAN LAND & LIVESTOCK, LLC 
Defendants and Petitioners. 
Court of Appeals Case No. 
20090512-CA 
Supreme Court No o n n n n n SC 
Appeal from upin. 
Court of Appeals 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONERS LYNN STEADMAN AND 
STEADMAN LAND & LIVESTOCK, LLC 
Jamis M. Gardner 
Jacob W. Dowse 
Thomas W. Seiler 
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, I .C. 
2500 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 84603-1266 
Provo, Utah 84603-1266 
Telephone: 801-375-1920 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Sabrina Rahofy 
Lowell V. Smith 
Trent 1). llolgate 
SMITH & GLAUSER 
1218 East 7800 South, Suite 300 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
Telephone: 801-562-5555 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
Lynn Steadman and 
Steadman Land & Livestock, LLC 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
AUG 1 7 OflM 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
SABRINA RAHOFY, an individual, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
LYNN STEADMAN, an individual, and 
STEADMAN LAND & LIVESTOCK, LLC 
Defendants and Petitioners. 
Court of Appeals Case No. 
20090512-C A 
Supreme Court No. 20110011 -SC 
Appeal from Opinion of the Utah 
Court of Appeals 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONERS LYNN STEADMAN AND 
STEADMAN LAND & LIVESTOCK, LLC 
Jamis M. Gardner 
Jacob W. Dowse 
Thomas W. Seiler 
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, L.C. 
2500 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 84603-1266 
Provo, Utah 84603-1266 
Telephone: 801-375-1920 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Sabrina Rahofy 
Lowell V. Smith 
Trent D. Holgate 
SMITH & GLAUSER 
1218 East 7800 South, Suite 300 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
Telephone: 801-562-5555 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
Lynn Steadman and 
Steadman Land & Livestock, LLC 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
' i l iC 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
CONSTITUTION; \ l PROVISIONS. S T A I U 1 E S . ORDINANCES, RULES, AND 
REGULATIONS . . v 
ARGUMENT 1 
I. PLAINTIFF DID NO i KAiSE ISSUES R I G \RDING RULE * B I T o R E 
THE TRIAL COURT AND DID NOT ALLOW THE TRIAL ( OUR I TO 
CONSIDER OR RULE ON THIS ISSUE 1 
II. \ | l l l l TRIA! ( O M ( l LEVEL. THE ISSUES PRESENTED DEALT 
^ i l l l l l l l SCOPE o i m i . RECORDS REQUESTED, NOT THE 
PROCESS 2 
III. THE U l A l i ^ O U R l UE AEPEALS rXIJKoiMRLl SOUGH 1 IO 
INTRUDE ON THE BROAD DISCRETIONARY ROWERS VESTED IN 
THE TRIA I COURT REGARDING DISCOVERY MATTERS 4 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ACTED Wl I 11 IN ITS DISCRETION IN 
ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO SIGN Ti l l -MEDICAL AND EMPLOYMENT 
RECORDS AUTHORIZATIONS ENABLING DEFENDANTS TO 
OBTAIN HER n n T . n F - < J T . v n - M i T W f M \ \ h E \ i r : ^ Mi 'NT 
RECORD^ 6 
V. REQUIRING PLAINTII 1 IO EXECU I E AU TIIORIZATIONSDOES NOT 
ALLOW DEFENDANTS ) HAVE -UNLET I EREI) ACCESS" TO 
PLAINTIFF'S RECORDS 8 
VI. IF THIS COURT DETERMINES TO CONSIDER H l h M h k i M i l i HE 
SCOPE OF THE AUTHORIZATIONS (WHICH IS \ TRIAL ( 'HURT 
FUNCTION) I HIS COURT SHOULD DETERMINE H I V ! HIE 
AUTHOR 1/ \ ! M )NS ARE APPROPRIATE 9 
•
;
-c on records IMamlifT has produced to date are records generated 
alter the present accident lccoid- which Plaintiff alleges verify her 
personal injur1, cLvi; • 10 
i i 
B. The trial court properly ruled that after Plaintiff identified her medical 
records and the type of treatment she received, Defendants could 
examine the list of providers and, if necessary, file a motion with the 
trial court requesting an in camera review of the records which Plaintiff 
claims are privileged 11 
C. The "reasonable certainty" standard sought by Plaintiff is inapplicable 
to the present case and should not be applied by Utah courts in a 
personal injury lawsuit 13 
D. The trial court set up multiple "safeguards" to protect Plaintiffs privacy 
concerns in this case 16 
E. Permitting Defendants to obtain Plaintiffs medical records by signed 
authorizations is not ex parte communication 17 
CONCLUSION 18 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 19 
i i i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Debry v. Goates, 2000 UT App 58, H 26, 999 P.2d 582 15, 17 
In re NTL, Inc. Sec. Litigation, 244 F.R.D. 179, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 7 
Factory Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nebraska Beef, Inc., Slip Copy, 2010 WL 1553458 
(D. Neb. 2010) 7 
F.D.I.C. v. Halpern, 271 F.R.D. 191, 2010 WL 4237950 (D. Nev. 2010) 7 
Forbes v. 21s ' Century Ins. Co., 258 F.R.D. 335, 2008 WL 2347327 (D. Ariz. 2009) . . . 7 
Henriksen v. State, 84 P.3d 38, 48-49 (Montana 2004) 11, 12 
Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Felman Production, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 609,2010 WL 3294389 (S.D.W. 
Va. 2010) 7 
R & R Energies v. Mother Earth Ind., 936 P.2d 1068, 303 Ut. Adv. Rep. 33 4 
Rahofy v. Steadman, et. al., 2010 UT App 350, H 3, 5, 11, 12 1, 4 ,5, 6, 9, 18 
Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Vecsey, 259 F.R.D. 23, 2009 WL 2781099, (D. Conn. 2009) 
7 
Sorenson v. Barbuto, 2008 UT 8,1 24, 177P.3d614 10, 11, 15, 18 
State v. Blake, 2000 Utah 113,1 19, 63P.3d56 13, 14 
State v. Cardall, 1999 UT 51, 982 P.2d 79 13, 14 
T.W. v. State, 2006 UT App. 259, 139 P.3d 312 13, 14 
U.E. ex. rel. Branch Consultants, LLC v. Allstate, Ins. Co., Slip Copy WL 3522958 (E.D. La. 
2010) 6, 7 
U.S. v. Int'l Union of Petroleum and Indust. Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 
1989) 7, 8 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., Slip Copy, 2011 WL 3418226, (N.D. 
OK 2011) 7 
1 \T 
Rules 
Rule 26(b)(1) Utah R. Civ. P 15, 16 
Rule 33, Utah R. Civ. P 4 
Rule 34, Utah R. Civ. P 1 ,5 ,6 ,7 
Rule 37, Utah R. Civ. P 1, 2, 5, 6 
Rule 506(d)(1) Utah R. Evid 9 
v 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF DID NOT RAISE ISSUES REGARDING RULE 37 BEFORE THE 
TRIAL COURT AND DID NOT ALLOW THE TRIAL COURT TO 
CONSIDER OR RULE ON THIS ISSUE. 
The Utah Court of Appeals stated that "Defendants provided very little legal or factual 
arguments, either at the district court or on appeal, regarding whether they followed the 
proper procedures pursuant to rules 34 and 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. "Rahofy 
v. Steadman, 2010 UT App. 350, ^  5, fn.6,245 P.3d 201. Relying on this language, Plaintiff, 
in her appellate brief, states that the Court of Appeals "found that the Defendants did not 
establish, or even attempt to establish, before the district court that they served Plaintiff with 
a document request in compliance with Rule 34(a)(1) of the Utah R. Civ. P,"p. 15. Plaintiff 
points out that "[t]he record does not include any Requests for Production of Documents 
served by Defendants," p. 15\ Plaintiff then claims that "the Court of Appeals correctly 
found that Defendants' Request for Production of Documents are not part of the record and 
further that Defendants failed to request the documents at issue pursuant to the discovery 
rules," p. 16. 
Defendant has sought to enlarge the record on appeal to demonstrate that, in fact, 
Requests for Production of Documents were served at the trial court level. It seems odd that 
Plaintiff would object to Defendants' efforts to establish before the appellate courts that 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents were, in fact, served at the trial 
court level. 
defendants have asked this Court to allow the record to be supplemented to 
allow the Court to consider the Interrogatories and Requests for Production. 
Further, Plaintiff's reliance on the absence of the Requests for Production of 
Documents in the record is even more curious when, as acknowledged by Plaintiff, the issues 
she now relies on (applicability of Rule 37) and the issues which formed the foundation of 
the Court of Appeals decision, were never discussed in memoranda nor argument before the 
trial court. Plaintiff acknowledged this fact in her initial brief to the Court of Appeals: 
Plaintiff concedes that Rule 37 and its requirements were never discussed in 
memoranda or argument related to Defendants' Motion to Compel. 
Plaintiff's brief, p. 28. 
Despite this acknowledgment that alleged failure to comply with Rule 37 was never 
raised before the trial court, Plaintiff now seeks to perpetuate the misunderstanding of the 
record because she raised on appeal, for the first time, the issue regarding alleged failure to 
comply with Rule 37. 
II. AT THE TRIAL COURT LEVEL, THE ISSUES PRESENTED DEALT WITH 
THE SCOPE OF THE RECORDS REQUESTED, NOT THE PROCESS. 
The issues presented to the trial court dealt with Defendants' right to seek Plaintiff's 
prior medical and employment records. Plaintiff claimed the efforts to obtain Plaintiff's 
medical records were an invasion of her privacy (R. 233, Transcript, p. 2), that the medical 
and employment records were "irrelevant" ("We've already - - like I said, we've provided 
them what - - everything we believe to be related to the collision. ..") (R. 233, Transcript, p. 
3), and that Plaintiff "still holds the privilege. She (not the trial court) gets to make that 
decision whether those are going to be released." (R. 233, Transcript, p. 5). Emphasis 
added. Plaintiff did not claim confusion as to what records Defendants sought to obtain. 
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Plaintiff did not object (at that time) to the procedure which had been followed to seek the 
records or to bring the issue before the trial court. Instead the argument before the trial court 
and, ultimately the trial court's ruling, addressed the specific issues presented to the trial 
court for consideration. 
The trial court determined, given the nature of the claims asserted, that the medical 
and employment records were subject to production. The trial court indicated, as far as the 
employment records are concerned, Defendants are entitled to obtain all employment records 
- including "access to whatever the defendant wants to spend the time looking for." The trial 
court correctly held that there is no "employment record privilege" and that Defendants 
could request Plaintiff's prior employment records even "back to when she was selling 
cookies when she was - - Girl Scout cookies." (R. 233, Transcript, p. 12). "They 
[Defendants] may very well be wasting their time, but it's their time they're wasting." (R. 
233, Transcript, p. 12). 
Regarding medical records, the trial court recognized that certain records may be 
protected from disclosure. "I fully agree with the plaintiff's position that there may be 
(medical) records that are irrelevant and shouldn't be disclosed, but I don't know that until 
I see them. " (R.233, Transcript, p. 13). The trial court established a procedure whereby it 
could review records to which a continuing privilege against disclosure was claimed. 
If Plaintiff had complaints with the method which Defendants had employed to seek 
the trial court's review of its efforts to obtain records, or if Plaintiff objected to Defendant's 
efforts to obtain signed authorizations for records, those complaints could have been (and 
should have been) directed to the trial court first - to allow the trial court (and Defendants) 
to address those issues then. Plaintiff made no such objection to the trial court, as she 
acknowledged in her initial brief to the Court of Appeals, but only focused on the scope of 
the discovery. 
III. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS IMPROPERLY SOUGHT TO INTRUDE 
ON THE BROAD DISCRETIONARY POWERS VESTED IN THE TRIAL 
COURT REGARDING DISCOVERY MATTERS. 
The Court of Appeals in Rahofyjoy reversing the trial court's order granting 
Defendants' Motion to Compel, has improperly sought to encroach upon the trial court's 
discretion in discovery matters. This Court has previously held that trial courts have broad 
discretion regarding discovery matters. R & R Energies v. Mother Earth Industries, 936 
P.2d 1068, (Utah 1997). 
Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that "Defendants must establish their entitlement 
using the proper procedures." Rahofy v. Steadman, 2010 UT App. 350 H 11. In fact, 
Defendants did present the trial court with the basis for their claims, the nature of the records 
requested, and the procedure employed to obtain those records. 
Plaintiffs sought information and documents pursuant to Rule 33 and 34, Utah R. Civ. 
Proc. The Court of Appeals incorrectly stated in Rahofy that "Rahofy responded to 
Defendant's motion [to compel] by arguing that... the request to sign the authorizations was 
an informal request...". Rahofy, % 3. A review of Plaintiff's memorandum opposing 
Defendants' Motion to Compel ( R. 83-96) and the transcript of the oral argument on 
defendants' Motion to Compel ( R. 233) shows this argument was not raised by Plaintiff 
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before the trial court. The focus on the dispute regarding the employment and medical 
authorizations was on the scope of the discovery requested, not the procedure. 
The Court of Appeals claimed that "Defendants attempted to avoid the requirements 
of rules 34 and 37 by arguing that the authorizations were the only way to access certain 
records because those records are located outside of Utah." Rahofy v. Steadman, 2010 UT 
App. 350 T| 11. In point of fact, Defendants did not attempt to avoid the requirements of Rule 
34 - but sought to obtain records pursuant to Rule 33 and 34. 
While Rule 37 deals with a trial court's authority to order a party to cooperate in 
discovery, Defendants had already requested Plaintiff to provide a copy of her pre-accident 
medical records pursuant to Ut. R. Civ. P. 34, but she failed/refused to do so. Defendants 
then prepared authorizations and requested Plaintiff to sign them so Defendants could obtain 
her medical and employment records directly. Rather than sign the authorizations, Plaintiff 
claimed that she had complied with the requirements of Rule 33 and Rule 34 by providing 
documents she actually had in her possession. 
In considering Defendants' Motion to Compel, the trial court properly exercised its 
discretion under Rule 37 and properly ordered Plaintiff to sign the authorizations, since the 
records sought by Defendants were within Plaintiff's "control," as discussed more fully 
below. 
Additionally, the trial court's Order regarding Defendants' Motion to Compel, was 
not a sanction against Plaintiff - the trial court simply applied its broad discretion in 
overseeing the discovery process. Rather, the trial court had authority under Rule 37 to grant 
Defendants' Motion to Compel Plaintiff to sign the authorizations as part of its inherent 
power to oversee and implement discovery procedures. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN 
ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO SIGN THE MEDICAL AND EMPLOYMENT 
RECORDS AUTHORIZATIONS ENABLING DEFENDANTS TO OBTAIN 
HER OUT-OF-STATE MEDICAL AND EMPLOYMENT RECORDS. 
The Court of Appeals held that the request by Defendants to have Plaintiff sign 
authorizations to allow them to obtain the requested records "circumvented the discovery 
rules." Rahofy v. Steadman, 2010 UT App. 350 \ 12. Defendants did not seek to 
"circumvent the discovery rules", but to use them to obtain records which were clearly 
relevant. 
Rule 34, Utah R. Civ. Proc. states: 
(a) Scope. Any party may serve on any other party a request: 
(a)(1) to produce and permit the party making the request, or someone acting 
on his behalf, to inspect, copy, test or sample any designated documents . . . 
which constitute or contain matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) and which 
are in the possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the request 
is served; or. . . 
Plaintiff claimed that she had fulfilled her obligation by producing all of the 
documents within her possession and/or custody. R. 233, Transcript,p. 3. However, Plaintiff 
owes a duty to produce documents also within her control. 
The term "control," in the context of Rule 34, Utah R. Civ. Proc. is to be broadly 
construed. The critical inquiry is whether there is access to the records sought. Even if 
records are sought from a non-party, if the records sought are within the party's ability to 
obtain the records, the records are subject to discovery. U.E. ex.relBranch Consultants, LLC 
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v. Allstate Ins. Co., Slip Copy WL 3522958 (E.D. La. 2010); F.D.LC. v. Halpern, 271 F.R.D. 
191,2010 WL 4237950 (D.New. 2010);ML Hawley Ins. Co. v. Felman Production, Inc., 269 
F.R.D. 609, 2010 WL 3294389 (S.D.W. Va. 2010); Factory Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nebraska Beef, 
Inc., Slip Copy, 2010 WL 1553458 (D. Neb. 2010). 
A party may have "control" over documents even where it does not have entitlement 
to the documents if it has the "practical ability to obtain" them. See, e.g., In reNTL, Inc. Sec. 
Litigation, 244 F.R.D. 179, 195 (S.D.N.Y 2007). "The concept of 'control' has been 
construed broadly. Under Rule 34, 'control5 does not require that the party have legal 
ownership or actual physical possession of the documents at issue; rather, documents are 
considered to be under a party's control when that party has the right, authority, or practical 
ability to obtain the documents from the non-party. . ." Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Vecsey, 
259 F.R.D.23, 2009 WL 2781099 (D. Conn. 2009). 
In Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., Slip Copy, 2011 WL 
3418226, (N.D. Okl. 2011) the Court noted: "'Control' comprehends not only possession but 
also the right, authority, or ability to obtain the documents. Rule 34 performs the same 
salutary function of creating access to documentation in an economical and expeditious 
fashion by requiring a party to produce relevant records not in its physical possession when 
the records can be obtained easily from a third party source." (Emphasis added). [See, also, 
Forbes v. 21st Century Ins. Co., 258 F.R.D. 335, 2008 WL 2347327 (D.Ariz 2009) for 
proposition that requests may be "through informal requests."] Control is defined as the legal 
right to obtain documents upon demand. U.S. v. Intl Union of Petroleum and Indust. 
Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1989). 
Here, the trial court properly determined the records requested by Defendants were 
within Plaintiff's "control." She could allow access to the records by simply executing 
authorizations. The trial court correctly ordered Plaintiff to sign the employment records 
authorizations and sign the authorizations for those records which Plaintiff did not assert a 
privacy privilege. 
V. REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO EXECUTE AUTHORIZATIONS DOES NOT 
ALLOW DEFENDANTS TO HAVE "UNFETTERED ACCESS" TO 
PLAINTIFF'S RECORDS. 
Plaintiff claims Defendants' request for her to sign the authorizations is improper 
because the authorizations would give Defendants "unfettered access to Plaintiff's entire 
medical history." R. p. 89. This allegation is not accurate. 
The trial court, after hearing oral argument from the parties regarding Defendants' 
Motion to Compel, properly ruled that Plaintiff was to provide to the Court and Defendants 
a list of her medical providers and, include a description of the medical issue which was 
presented to the provider. The trial court instructed Plaintiff "You don't have to go into any 
detail, but just that much information." R. 233, Transcript, pp. 12-13. 
The trial court also gave Plaintiff an opportunity to object to specific records which 
Plaintiff believes are not relevant to the case and should not be disclosed to the Defendants. 
R. 233, Transcript, p. 13. The trial court then gave Defendants the opportunity to file a 
motion with the Court to review the records to which Plaintiff claimed a privilege, and the 
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Court would review the records in camera and make a determination as to whether or not the 
records should be disclosed. R. 233, Transcript, pp. 13-15. The trial court would determine 
whether Defendants have a right to receive and review the records. 
VL IF THIS COURT DETERMINES TO CONSIDER THE MERITS OF THE 
SCOPE OF THE AUTHORIZATIONS (WHICH IS A TRIAL COURT 
FUNCTION) THIS COURT SHOULD DETERMINE THAT THE 
AUTHORIZATIONS ARE APPROPRIATE. 
The Court of Appeals in Rahofy, supra, indicated "We make no determination as to 
whether the medical and employment records are relevant or privileged. We also need not 
make any determination as to the appropriate method for obtaining authorizations for release 
of records except as stated herein." Id. at f 11, fn. 10. 
Plaintiff claims that the records requested are not related to the conditions at issue, that 
Defendants failed to make a showing with "reasonable certainty" that evidence favorable to 
Defendants' claims exist and that the trial court incorrectly shifted "the burden to Plaintiffs' 
to produce her medical records. 
In the event this Court decides to address the merits of Defendants' position regarding 
the employment and medical authorizations (which issues were not certified by this Court for 
appeal) Defendants present the following: 
Utah law is clear there is no privilege pertaining to any communication which is 
"relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of the patient in any 
proceeding in which that condition is an element of any . . . defense." Utah Rules of 
Evidence, § 506(d)(1). Therefore, there is no privilege to Plaintiff's medical records in 
connection with any claims related to her injuries she alleges she sustained in the present 
accident. 
A. The only records Plaintiff has produced to date are records generated 
after the present accident - records which Plaintiff alleges verify her 
personal injury claims. 
Plaintiff claimed in her brief to the Court of Appeals that "Plaintiff has already 
provided to the defendants all known medical records related to the treatment received by 
Plaintiff as a result of the collision." Plaintiff's Brief to Court of Appeals, p. 14. It is telling 
that Plaintiff did not state she has produced any records which pre-existed the accident, only 
that she has produced records which she feels are related to treatment she received "as a 
result of the collision." Further, Plaintiff's counsel told the trial court during oral argument 
on Defendants' Motion to Compel " . . . [W]e gave them everything we believe to be 
relevant, but now they want more than that." R. 233, Transcript, p. 5, (emphasis added). 
It is not Plaintiff's prerogative to make the determination whether the medical records 
requested by defendants are relevant. 
Plaintiff also cites Sorenson v. Barbuto, 2008 Utah 8, 177 P.3 614, for support that 
her medical records need not be provided. Plaintiff's Supreme Court Brief, p. 33. However, 
Sorenson clearly directs that Plaintiff is not in control of what records are to be produced to 
Defendants. The Utah Supreme Court, in Sorenson v. Barbuto, 2008 Utah 8, % 24 stated: 
Such information may still be obtained through traditional forms of formal 
discovery. Our holding should not be construed as putting the patient in 
control of what medical information is made available to opposing counsel and 
what is kept private. Making this information available through formal 
methods of discovery strikes a balance between enabling the patient to protect 
confidential medical information that has no relevance to the civil action and 
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providing the patient's adversary access to information that is relevant to a 
condition placed at issue in the case. 
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in ordering Plaintiff to identify her 
prior medical providers and sign authorizations enabling Defendants (subject to trial court 
in camera review, if necessary) to obtain her prior medical records. 
B. The trial court properly ruled that after Plaintiff identified her medical 
records and the type of treatment she received, Defendants could examine 
the list of providers and, if necessary, file a motion with the trial court 
requesting an in camera review of the records which Plaintiff claims are 
privileged. 
The trial court ordered that within 30 days after receiving the list of Plaintiff's medical 
providers identifying the doctor and type of medical treatment she received, Defendants 
could object to any specific records identified by Plaintiff as records to which she claims a 
specific privilege, and to identify specifically why the record should not be produced. 
Defendants, if they disagreed with the objection, would then be entitled to file a motion with 
the court for an in camera review of the records to determine whether the disputed records 
are discoverable. As the trial court judge correctly stated "I fully agree with the Plaintiff's 
position that there may be records that are irrelevant and shouldn't be disclosed, but I don't 
know that until I see them." R. 233, Transcript, p. 13. 
In Henricksen v. State, 84 P.3rd 38, 48-49 (Montana 2004), the Montana Supreme 
Court reversed a trial court's decision to prevent the defendant from obtaining plaintiff's 
mental and medical health records. The plaintiff in that case argued because she provided 
her doctors with complete copies of her disputed medical records, and the doctors stated the 
records showed no causal connection between any prior injury or condition and her current 
1 1 
injuries, this ended the inquiry into the medical records. The plaintiff in Henriksen also 
argued that the defendant should be denied access to the records because the defendant did 
not present any expert medical opinion that plaintiff's alleged injuries were more probably 
than not caused by some other factor than her claimed cause of action. In rejecting this 
argument, the Henriksen Court stated: "The fallacy in this argument is that there is no way 
that the State [defendant] couldhave provided this opinion because it was denied access to 
the very records which would have enabled it to make this determination. The [trial] court's 
denial of these records only allowed for a one sided view review of the medical records by 
. . . [plaintiffs'] physicians." The Henriksen further opined "[Defendant]. . . was prejudiced 
when it was denied the right to defend itself in an informed matter. It had the right to 
discover evidence related to prior physical or mental conditions possibly connected to . . . 
[plaintiffs] current damages." Henriksen at 49 (Emphasis in original). 
Likewise, in the present case, Defendants will be prejudiced if denied the right to 
defend themselves in an informed manner. Plaintiff objects to either allowing Defendants 
(or the trial court, in an in camera review) to determine whether medical records are relevant. 
She wants to be the "gate keeper" regarding her records, without judicial review. Clearly her 
position is untenable. 
The trial court was within its discretion to order Plaintiff to provide a list of her 
providers and the treatment she received so a determination could be made by the court 
whether the records are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence 
in this case. 
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C. The "reasonable certainty" standard sought by Plaintiff is inapplicable to 
the present case and should not be applied by Utah courts in a personal 
injury lawsuit. 
Plaintiff cites State v. Cardall, 1999 UT 51, 982 P.2 79, and T.W. v. State, 2006 Utah 
App. 259, 139 P.3d 312, for the proposition that Defendants are required to show with 
"reasonable certainty" that some evidence favorable to their defenses exists, before an in 
camera review can occur. However, each of the cases cited by Plaintiff are distinguishable 
from the present case before this court. Both the Cardall and T. W. v. State cases, supra, were 
criminal matters involving the victims of sexual crimes. In Cardall, the defendant sought 
to obtain a victim's psychological records, and understandably, the victim fought to have 
these records kept private. The Cardall court held in order for the defendant to obtain these 
records, he must show with "reasonable certainty" that the records contained favorable 
evidence to the defense. Cardall, at ^ 28-30. Likewise, T. W. v. State involved charges of 
unlawful sexual activity with a minor. The defendant in that case sought counseling records 
of the minor victim. The Court held the defendant needed to establish with "reasonable 
certainty" that the records contained information supporting defendant's defenses. The trial 
court denied the defendant access to the victim's prior records. T. W. v. State, W 14-16. 
In State v. Blake, 2000 Utah 113, % 19, 63 P.3d 56, the Utah Supreme Court discussed 
what is necessary to prove "reasonable certainty" and stated "exactly how much is required 
to satisfy the 'reasonable certainty' test of Cardall varies with each case . . ." The Blake 
court continued, "the reasonable probability standard lies somewhere between "mere 
possibility" and "more likely than not." . . . On a similar spectrum, "reasonable certainty" 
within the meaning of Cardall, lies on the more stringent side of "more likely than not." 
Blake,\ 19. 
It is important to recognize that Cardall, T. W.y andBlake, all involved criminal sexual 
charges and the extremely high standard necessary to even view the victim's records was 
warranted because there is a strong public policy in favor of the privacy rights of victims of 
sexual crimes. The Court in Blake acknowledged that the precise parameters of the 
"reasonable certainty" test would vary according to the particular circumstances of each case. 
There are several other distinguishable differences between policy considerations 
behind the "reasonable certainty" standard adopted by Utah courts in criminal cases, and 
cases decided in a civil personal injury context. First, in a criminal case, it is the State, 
(prosecutor) who brings the action; not the victim of the crime. In a civil personal injury 
case, it is the plaintiff who voluntarily chooses to file suit against a defendant and places her 
health condition in issue. Second, in a criminal case, the nexus between a criminal defendant 
seeking medical records of a crime victim is not to disprove the victim's injuries, but to 
impeach the victim's veracity. In civil personal injury case, the reason for a defendant 
seeking plaintiff's medical records is to establish a pre-accident standard against which to 
evaluate claimed injuries. 
Finally, the "reasonable certainty" test is not practical in civil cases. In a civil context, 
to require a party to show with "reasonable certainty" that favorable evidence exists prior to 
an in camera review puts the cart before the horse. Defendants must be allowed, at a 
minimum, to discover the identity of Plaintiff's prior medical providers and the treatment 
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rendered by the providers in order to determine whether favorable evidence supporting 
Defendant's defenses would likely be contained within the records. This is the very purpose 
for which discovery is conducted. The trial court's Order for Plaintiff to disclose her medical 
providers and the type of treatment rendered is "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery 
of admissible evidence" as required by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), and therefore, 
was within the trial court's sound discretion. 
Plaintiff has also referred to Debry v. Goates, 2000 Utah App. 58, U 26, 999 P.2d 582, 
for the proposition that the "reasonable certainty" test should be required to determine if an 
in camera review of plaintiff's medical records should be conducted to assess whether a 
privilege exists. Plaintiff's Brief, p. 39. However, the Debry case involved a divorce action 
(not a claim for personal injuries) in which the mental health of Mrs. Debry was put at issue 
by her ex husband, not by Mrs. Debry. She had not placed her mental health in issue. She 
had not voluntarily waived her privilege against disclosure by seeking damages for an alleged 
impairment to her physical health. In the present case, Plaintiff has put her physical health, 
as well as her employment history in issue by making bodily injury and economic loss claims 
in this lawsuit. 
The trial court's Order in the present case precisely complies with the procedural 
requirements of Rule 26, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as the reasoning of the 
Sorenson case. The effect of the trial court's Order is to identify the requested documents 
in such a manner so as to allow Defendants to assess whether the privilege or protection 
would arguably apply. If a dispute remains concerning Defendants' receipt and review of 
the records, the trial court agreed to conduct an in camera inspection of the 
requested/withheld records. Consistent with Rule 26, "other parties" (including the trial 
court) are empowered to independently assess the applicability of the claim of privilege or 
protection, rather than simply rely on the information Plaintiff chooses to disclose. The 
Rules of Civil Procedure support the procedure outlined by the trial court in this case. 
D. The trial court set up multiple "safeguards" to protect Plaintiff's privacy 
concerns in this case. 
The trial court, in its Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Compel, properly 
exercised its discretion and instituted safeguards which protect plaintiffs privacy concerns. 
For Plaintiff to claim her prior medical records are not relevant to the present lawsuit 
is absurd. Plaintiff's assertion that prior medical records not directly related to her alleged 
crash injuries are not discoverable is likewise unfounded. 
Records from a personal injury plaintiff's pre-accident providers would be important 
to determine ongoing physical complaints (if any) and patient histories other than the specific 
complaint a patient seeks treatment for during that specific visit. Most medical providers 
typically have a "patient history questionnaire" which asks the patient to identify any prior 
medical treatment received. These questionnaires which identify the health history of the 
patient are relevant in showing the patient's prior medical condition. Therefore, Defendants' 
request to obtain Plaintiff's pre-accident medical records is reasonably calculated to lead to 
the discovery of admissible evidence and the trial court properly granted Defendant's Motion 
to Compel. 
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As stated by the Utah Court of Appeals in Debry, supra, "The patient bears the burden 
of establishing the applicability of the [physician-patient] privilege." Debry at ^ 16. 
Therefore, in the present case, Plaintiff has the duty to establish a privilege applies to her 
records and the trial court judge properly placed the burden on Plaintiff to demonstrate why 
her records from her individual medical providers are protected by privilege. Plaintiff has 
placed her physical condition at issue by filing the present lawsuit, yet refuses to cooperate 
in disclosing her pre-accident medical providers and the type of treatment they rendered. 
Plaintiff cannot have it both ways. Either she must cooperate in discovery or Plaintiffs 
personal injury claims must be dismissed. 
E. Permitting Defendants to obtain Plaintiff's medical records by signed 
authorizations is not ex parte communication* 
The proposed authorizations submitted to Plaintiff do not allow (and Defendants have 
never suggested) Plaintiffs health care providers to unilaterally discuss Plaintiffs 
Complaints with Defendants. The authorizations, when executed by Plaintiff, simply permit 
the release of Plaintiff s medical records and do not provide Defendants with the right of ex-
parte communication. No ex parte contact with Plaintiffs providers will take place. Should 
Defendants determine it is necessary to discuss Plaintiff s medical treatment with her medical 
providers, the depositions of these providers would be scheduled. Plaintiffs counsel would 
be entitled to be present at the depositions. 
i n 
CONCLUSION 
The documents (employment/medical records) sought by Defendants are relevant to 
the claims made by the Plaintiff and the defenses asserted in this lawsuit. Against Plaintiffs 
claims of privilege, the trial court appropriately exercised its judicial discretion in providing 
a mechanism whereby the rights of both Plaintiff and Defendants would be protected. Based 
upon the foregoing analysis, this Court should determine the trial court was within its broad 
discretion to order Plaintiff to sign the medical records and employment records 
authorizations. The holding of the Court of Appeals in Rahofy should be reversed. 
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